Shadow, Self, and the Other: A Critique of Simone de Beauvoir’s Existential Projection and Gendered Misrecognition

Abstract: This treatise critically explores Simone de Beauvoir's existential feminist thought through a psycho-philosophical lens. Drawing on Jungian theory, existentialist principles, and the notion of projective identification, it argues that de Beauvoir's account of gender relations is marred by a deep psychological projection of her personal alienation onto men, resulting in a misreading of male subjectivity and a self-centered distortion of individualism. Through this lens, de Beauvoir’s framework inadvertently ossifies gender binaries and undermines the shared existential condition that ought to unite rather than divide the sexes.

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I. Projection of the Shadow: De Beauvoir’s Alienation and Projective Identification

In the Jungian schema, the shadow represents those unconscious elements of the self—often repressed instincts, desires, or vulnerabilities—that the ego refuses to integrate. When unacknowledged, these shadow elements are projected onto external figures, typically in adversarial or oppositional roles. Simone de Beauvoir’s feminist existentialism, particularly in The Second Sex, can be interpreted as a profound case of such psychological projection.

Existential alienation, a core theme of de Beauvoir’s existentialism, plays a central role in this dynamic. Her identification of women as the Other—the alienated half of the human species in a world dominated by male self-definition—reflects a gendered distortion of a genuine existential anxiety. Yet, rather than confronting this existential alienation as a shared human condition, she appears to externalize it, projecting it onto men as agents of women’s marginalization.

This process resonates with the psychoanalytic notion of projective identification, wherein one not only attributes disowned feelings to another but also unconsciously coerces the other to embody them. De Beauvoir’s portrayal of men as oppressors may thus reflect not only an ideological critique but an unconscious displacement of her own existential disquiet. Her estrangement—her personal and intellectual alienation as a human being in an existentially unstable, unsure and unpredictable reality—becomes a mirror image of gendered inversion cast onto men, who are rendered not as fellow travelers in the existential journey, but as symbolic containers of alienation and repression.

Thus, men are not merely situated as historical agents of domination but come to represent the existential cause of her inner condition. Her narrative constructs a closed loop: the human existential alienation is experienced internally, denied in its universal nature, then projected outward as a political and metaphysical system of male oppression. This fusion of psychological projection with philosophical abstraction distorts the possibility of mutual recognition between the sexes.

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II. Individualism versus Self-Centeredness: A Philosophical Misstep

Existentialism, at its core, upholds a radical individualism grounded in authenticity, freedom, and moral responsibility. It demands the forging of one’s essence through action and choice, and it affirms the necessity of confronting both one's freedom and the existence of the Other.

However, in de Beauvoir’s case, there appears to be a slippage from individualism to self-centeredness. What should have been an open-ended inquiry into shared existential conditions across gender lines became narrowly focused on her own experience as a woman in an alleged oppressive structure. Thus, she now also projects her inner prison and cast it unto men Her personal existential predicament—of alienation, exclusion, and identity—was generalized as the universal condition of woman, and men were correspondingly reduced to the foil against which that condition gained meaning.

The existential self became the self-centered subject, viewing others not as subjects in their own right but as objects to her narrative. The very structure of existentialism—its emphasis on personal responsibility and the necessity of recognizing others as equally free beings—was inverted. Instead of recognizing men as autonomous subjects also suffering from alienation, absurdity, and the burdens of freedom, she construed them only in terms of their relation to her own image as a woman.

This misapplication transformed existentialism from a universal ethic of authenticity into a particularistic moral economy, where gendered experience became the exclusive axis of truth and justice. By conflating existential individualism with personal grievance, she compromised the very ontological openness that existentialism seeks to cultivate.

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III. De Beauvoir’s Misreading of Male Subjectivity and Historical Gender Codes

The third and perhaps most consequential philosophical error in de Beauvoir’s work is her failure to acknowledge men’s subjectivity. In an existential framework that demands the encounter with the Other as a condition for ethical existence, de Beauvoir paradoxically denies full subjectivity to men, seeing them primarily as agents of objectification and oppression.

Her analysis omits a genuine intersubjectivity; instead, it narrates men as structural beings devoid of personal struggle or existential anguish. There is no space in her schema for male existential suffering—only male historical dominance. This epistemic erasure of male subjectivity creates a binary that is not only philosophically reductive but politically dangerous: women are subjects struggling for freedom; men are objects of critique, denied the complexity of their being.

Moreover, de Beauvoir’s apparent misreading of historical gender dynamics, such as the medieval Pointevin Code or traditions of courtly love, further entrenches this error. She interprets these realities and the historical practices of male subordination or romantic submission not as meaningful gender performances or reversals, but as veils for deeper oppression. This hermeneutic of suspicion is totalizing; it leaves no room for nuance, reciprocity, or historical contingency.

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Conclusion: The Distortion of Gender through Existential Projection

Though, Simone de Beauvoir’s contribution to feminist philosophy remains foundational, yet her philosophical framework is not immune to critical scrutiny, even if it is iconoclastic. Her existential project, grounded in alienation and the search for authenticity, became entangled in projective dynamics and self-centered interpretation. By failing to integrate her own shadow—the internal alienation she experienced—she projected it onto men and constructed a fake gendered metaphysics of oppression.

What could have been a shared philosophical project of human liberation became instead a gendered dualism, wherein male subjectivity was sacrificed on the altar of female emancipation. In denying the existential subjectivity of men, she undermined the mutuality that existentialism seeks to affirm. By reducing men to the Other and elevating women’s experience as absolute, she replaced ontological openness with psychological closure.

De Beauvoir’s The Second Sex thus reveals itself less as a pioneering but more as problematic text, both in identifying only thecwoman as the other and also in its psychic transference of alienation, its philosophical solipsism, and its refusal of male intersubjectivity. A truer existentialism must move beyond such projections and acknowledge the shared burdens of freedom, alienation, and the human condition—common to all, despite being experienced in different gendered forms.

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