Meta-Analysis of Rhetorical Power: Who May Speak, and Who Must Be Silenced?

At the heart of the evolving discourse surrounding misogyny lies a deeper question—who holds the power to speak, critique, and define legitimacy within public and moral discourse? The term misogyny does not operate in a rhetorical vacuum; it is embedded within power-laden structures of narrative control, emotional legitimacy, and cultural framing. Analyzing misogyny not as a descriptor of hatred but as a discursive tool invites us to interrogate the rules of speech itself—rules that are not neutral but constructed through the selective application of moral reflexes.

This rhetorical asymmetry becomes evident in how society reacts differently to gendered critique. When women are the subjects of criticism, even nuanced or evidence-based analysis is frequently interpreted through a moral lens—as inherently hostile or offensive. When men are targeted, often through caricature, satire, or outright vilification, the reaction is one of cultural amusement or indifference. This asymmetry is not accidental; it is structured through a framework of emotional veto power, wherein offense taken by women holds higher discursive weight than injury inflicted on men. The accusation of misogyny operates here not merely as a descriptor but as a moral trump card that bypasses the need for engagement or refutation.

Moreover, this framework reshapes epistemic legitimacy: to speak critically of women—or of feminist dogma—is to risk reputational harm, academic ostracism, or social shaming. To speak critically of men, however, carries no such taboo. In effect, this creates a moral double standard that sanctions critique in one direction while criminalizing it in the other. The rules of discourse are thus not equally applied but structured in a way that reproduces cultural gynocentrism under the guise of moral sensitivity.

This discursive pattern is further reinforced by institutional actors—media, academia, NGOs, and public education—who not only normalize male devaluation but also enforce the boundaries of permissible critique. Here, we see what Michel Foucault would describe as a regime of truth: a system that does not merely reflect knowledge but actively regulates what may be said, who may say it, and what is to be silenced.

In such a regime, the term misogyny functions much like the term heresy in pre-modern theocratic societies—not simply as a description of deviance, but as a mechanism of expulsion from the moral community. To be accused is to be delegitimized, regardless of argument. The label removes the speaker from rational discourse and places them in the realm of the morally unclean. It is no longer an invitation to examine what is said, but a command to judge who is speaking.

This meta-discursive structure reveals the profound transformation of misogyny from a descriptor of alleged social injustice into a regulative ideal that governs speech, enforces ideological conformity, and protects a privileged moral narrative. It is not misogyny per se that is being exposed—it is the power to define misogyny, and thus to determine what may be criticized and what must remain sacred.

In this light, the study of misogyny becomes a case study in discursive sovereignty: the ability to dominate the terrain of public morality not through argument, but through preemptive moral framing. It shows how ideological systems maintain control not only through institutions, but through the language games that regulate who may speak, who may judge, and who must be silent.

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